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“THE NAV Y’S SUCCESS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF”?
The German Navy’s Independent Energy Security Strategy,
1932–1940
Anand Toprani

[The] Naval High Command has from the very beginning operated from
the conviction—especially in view of the lessons Italy had to learn during the Abyssinian War—that in any military conflict, particularly one
in which England is in any way involved, economic warfare will play a
considerable role alongside military operations. In view of the fact that
England has at its disposal connections around the world, it is only possible for the navy to secure oil supplies from overseas through long and
exhaustive preparation.
ADMIRAL ERICH RAEDER TO ECONOMICS MINISTER WALTHER FUNK, 6 MAY 1940

[You claim] that only the Naval High Command has failed to show any
appreciation for your efforts with regard to petroleum supplies. This is
correct. The Naval High Command recognized from the start that, by
pursuing a wartime petroleum supply policy under the influence of the
major oil companies, your department was following a path that must
eventually lead to calamity.

T

RAEDER TO FUNK, 27 JUNE 1940

he National Socialists’ primary foreign policy objective after taking office
was to rearm Germany so that it might reverse the verdict of the First World
War and acquire the “living space” necessary to becoming a world power on par
with Britain or the United States. For the German armed services, the Third
Reich’s ambitious plans meant that they were
Anand Toprani is an Assistant Professor of Strategy
compelled to broaden their missions and operaand Policy at the Naval War College. He received an
AB in history from Cornell University, an MPhil in tional capabilities. For its part, the German navy
modern European history from University College, expanded between 1933 and 1939 from a coastalOxford, and a PhD in history from Georgetown Unidefense force to one capable of deploying a fleet to
versity. He is a specialist in energy geopolitics, greatpower relations, and military history.
challenge the Royal Navy for command of the seas.
But this would be impossible without sufficient
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raw materials, most importantly petroleum to fuel
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the navy’s surface ships and submarines. As an oil-poor nation vulnerable to
blockade and short of foreign exchange to pay for imports, Germany had to make
hard choices about how to allocate its limited supplies of petroleum—not just
between the military and civilian consumers but also among the armed services.
Since the Third Reich required continental hegemony before it could aspire
to global supremacy, German leaders devoted their limited economic resources
to satisfying the petroleum requirements of their army and air force (gasoline
and aviation fuel) before those of the navy (fuel oil and diesel fuel). The German navy resented its subordinate status and—as befits a budding maritime
force with global aspirations—pursued an independent energy-security strategy
that featured acquiring in Iraq and Mexico oil concessions that would allow it to
stockpile large quantities of petroleum in peacetime. But the navy’s long-term oil
ambitions—and bureaucratic manipulations—conflicted with the overall energysecurity strategy of the Third Reich, which was focused on the short-term goal of
fueling a land and air struggle for the mastery of Europe. Although Adolf Hitler
expected the navy to play a much larger role in achieving German objectives
than even the naval leadership initially expected, other agencies with competing
ideas about how to guarantee Germany’s energy security joined forces to quash
the navy’s plans in Iraq and Mexico in 1936 and 1938 before they did irreparable
damage to Germany’s relations with the major U.S. and British oil companies,
which were the Third Reich’s most important foreign suppliers of oil prior to the
outbreak of the Second World War.
THE PROBLEM OF NAVAL FUEL SUPPLIES IN THE THIRD REICH
In the years between the National Socialist “seizure of power” in 1933 and the
outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the Third Reich made impressive
strides in increasing Germany’s supply of petroleum (see table 1). The centerpiece of Germany’s energy-security strategy to increase domestic production
of petroleum was the development of a synthetic-fuel industry. Since before the
First World War German scientists had been perfecting methods of synthesizing
various petroleum products from coal—first the Bergius process (1913), which
yielded gasoline, then the Fischer-Tropsch process (1926), which could produce
heavier fuels, such as diesel, but was more expensive than the Bergius process.
The National Socialists did not stop at synthetic fuel; they embraced what we
would today call an “all of the above” approach, including incentivizing domestic
crude-oil production and curtailing civilian consumption (0.312 barrels of gasoline per capita in Germany, compared with 0.98 in Great Britain and 3.99 in the
United States by 1938).1
Nevertheless, total consumption within Germany still rose as the economy
recovered from the Great Depression, and although domestic synthetic- and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/7
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TABLE 1
GERMANY’S PETROLEUM SUPPLY, 1933–1939
(THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS)
Refined Petroleum
(natural & synthetic)

Year

Crude Oil

Imports

1933

230

291

2,685

1934

318

N/A

3,155

1935

427

N/A

3,826

1936

445

N/A

4,229

1937

453

620

4,313

Synthetic Fuel Only
1938

552

1,600

4,957

1939

888

2,200

5,165

Note: Crude oil statistics for 1938–39 includes Austrian output. Figures drawn from Reichs-KreditGesellschaft AG, “Treibstoffwirtschaft in der Welt und in Deutschland”; and USSBS, Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy, p. 75.
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crude-oil production
managed to keep pace,
the share of imports
within Germany’s overall supply of petroleum
d i d n ot d e c l i n e ( 7 0
percent by 1938). Nor,
for that matter, were the
armed services able to
make significant progress in accumulating
stockpiles, even though
they knew full well from
their experience during
the Great War that they
could not expect to im
port much from over-

seas in the event of a British blockade.2
The most pressing challenge was, however, the cost of importing petroleum
to meet rising domestic consumption—from 2,478,000 tons in 1932 to 5,165,000
tons in 1939. Importing large quantities of petroleum in peacetime was not a
straightforward matter, since the U.S. and British oil companies that dominated
the global oil industry demanded at least partial repayment in hard currency.3 As
a result, German expenditures of foreign exchange for petroleum imports almost
doubled during the first half of the Third Reich, from 129,800,000 Reichsmarks
(RM) in 1933 to 230,000,000 RM in 1939.4 Under normal circumstances this
would not pose an insurmountable challenge, since a modern industrial nation
can simply boost its exports to balance its current account. Germany was not,
however, operating under normal economic conditions after the National Socialists took power. The Great Depression and the collapse in global trade had
wiped out most of Germany’s foreign-exchange reserves before 1933, after which
rearmament soaked up German industrial and domestic raw materials (e.g., coal)
production, leaving only small quantities available for export. The need to import
food and strategic raw materials and to service the German foreign debt, as well
as fears of unleashing inflation, convinced Hitler and Hjalmar Schacht (then
president of the Reichsbank and later minister of economics) to reject the path
taken by Britain and the United States and devalue the Reichsmark.5 This meant
that German exports were overvalued by as much as 40 percent compared with
those priced in dollars or sterling.6 Although this eased Germany’s import bill,
reduced exports meant lower earnings of foreign exchange, which (along with the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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overall rise in commodity prices as the global economy recovered from the Great
Depression) impaired the Third Reich’s ability to cover the gap between its consumption and production of most key strategic raw materials through imports.7
Even Romania, which became Germany’s most important source of oil after
1939 and later joined the Axis, was not a reliable supplier. Production there
peaked in 1936 at 8,700,000 tons—good for fourth place among world oil producers but only 5 percent of the output of the United States. Six of the seven largest oil companies in Romania before the war, accounting for roughly 80 percent
of that nation’s production, were owned by American, British, Dutch, French,
and Belgian oil companies or banks, while Romanian, Italian, and German firms
controlled the remaining production. The Romanian government meanwhile
received royalties from the foreign oil companies in the form of crude oil (11–12
percent of total production). The major obstacle from Germany’s perspective was
that it could not import oil at will. Starting in 1935, Bucharest limited the amount
of oil it exported to Germany that could be paid for through clearing agreements
(see below) to 25 percent of the total value of all exports.8
During the Third Reich, Germany used a variety of methods to finance international trade, including “clearing agreements,” “barter agreements,” and payment in “blocked currency.” Clearing agreements are basically pools of money
into which a nation’s exporters deposit the hard-currency proceeds of their sales;
importers thereafter draw from these pools to finance their purchases. Barter
agreements are transactions denominated in finished or unfinished goods. Finally, the Reich created “blocked currency” known as “Askimarks” (a German
portmanteau word for Foreigners’ Special Accounts for Domestic Payment) to
finance trade with Latin America. These “Askimarks” were nonconvertible and
could only be used to purchase specified German goods.9 In all three instances,
the guiding principle was to keep the amount of money that changed hands to a
minimum. This included both foreign exchange (e.g., dollars and sterling) and
the Reichsmark, whose value would drop if foreigners exchanged it for other currencies. The Third Reich was happy to allow foreign firms to accumulate their
earnings within Germany, provided that they did not repatriate them. This was
of course unacceptable to the U.S. and British oil companies, which had to remit
at least some of their earnings back home.10
One method of meeting Germany’s oil requirements at minimal cost to the
country’s dwindling reserves of foreign exchange was importing crude oil directly
from Iraq through the British Oil Development Company (BOD), a multinational combine that won the oil concession for all of Iraq west of the Tigris River in
1932. Even though supplies from Iraq would be unavailable in the event of a British blockade, many German officials—especially the navy leadership—hoped the
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BOD would facilitate the stockpiling of oil in peacetime and reduce Germany’s
dependence on the U.S. and British major oil companies.11 Another alternative
was to take advantage of Mexico’s nationalization of its oil industry in 1938 to
purchase the now-discounted Mexican oil with minimal expenditure of foreign
exchange.12 The story of German participation in the BOD and of subsequent
efforts in Mexico therefore offers a valuable perspective on the role of one relatively autonomous agency—the German navy—in defining and implementing an
independent energy-security strategy within the framework of Germany’s overall
preparations to wage another world war.13
German naval policy during the early years of the Third Reich was relatively modest in scope and objectives. Building on the lessons of the First World War, Admiral Erich Raeder (commander in chief of the German navy) ruled out building a
fleet capable of challenging the Royal Navy, preferring a smaller fleet composed
of “pocket battleships,” cruisers, aircraft carriers, and submarines. Moreover, he
considered France, rather than Britain, both the quantitative benchmark and the
expected opponent.14 Consequently, when it came to petroleum requirements the
navy was a minor player by comparison with its sister services.15 In 1935, a year
before Germany embraced a policy of self-sufficiency in petroleum through the
Four-Year Plan (mainly by boosting production of synthetic fuel), the German
navy imported roughly 75 percent of its requirements.16 The following year, the
Naval High Command projected its annual wartime needs as of 1939 at only
1,400,000 tons of fuel oil and 400,000 tons of diesel fuel, all of which it expected
would be supplied from domestic production and reserves.17 By 1938, however,
as the process of rearmament gathered steam, the German navy was estimating
it would require as much as 4,500,000 tons of fuel oil per year in wartime. Since
domestic production of fuel oil was well behind expectations (only 130,000 tons
per annum), the navy had no option but to import most of its requirements.18
The navy’s requirements continued to balloon as Germany’s aggressive foreign policy increased the probability of a great-power conflict. Starting in 1933,
Raeder had sought to manipulate Hitler into granting the navy a larger slice of
the resource pie by framing the desired naval construction program in terms designed to appeal to Hitler’s stated policy preferences. Hitler had, since his earliest
days in politics and explicitly in Mein Kampf and his unpublished “Second Book,”
spoken in favor of an alliance with Britain and Italy directed against France, then
the Soviet Union, and finally the United States. Following Hitler’s cues, rather
than demanding a fleet equal to that of the Royal Navy the navy asked for one
equal to that of France, which it hoped would enhance Germany’s value as an ally
to Britain (i.e., in accord with Hitler’s grand strategy).19
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Raeder (second from left), General Werner von Blomberg (minister of war; third from left), and Hitler on board the battleship Deutschland in April 1934
Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1987-0703-514 / CC-BY-SA

Raeder, then, was caught flat-footed when Hitler abruptly abandoned his efforts to woo Britain and instead sought to use the German navy as a deterrent
against it. As relations with Britain deteriorated in the wake of the Anschluss with
Austria and the onset of the Sudeten crisis in the summer of 1938, Hitler pushed
the navy to adopt more and more expansive construction programs. Raeder still
preferred a balanced fleet designed to wage a guerre de course against Britain, but
Hitler overruled him and demanded additional capital ships. This process culminated in the “Z-Plan” of January 1939, which envisaged the creation by 1946
of a fleet of superbattleships capable of challenging the Royal Navy for maritime
dominance.20 As a result of the Z-Plan the navy’s annual requirements of fuel
oil and diesel fuel in wartime would skyrocket to eight million tons by 1947–48,
whereas the entire German domestic production of all petroleum products
in 1938 totaled a mere 6,150,000 tons. Even assuming sufficient oil could be
found—which was unlikely, since the air force had also received permission to
quintuple its frontline and reserve strength—the navy would need to construct
ten million tons of fuel-storage capacity at a time when there was insufficient
coal, iron, or steel available to meet existing armaments or economic programs
(including the expansion of synthetic-fuel production).21
As early as 1937, in fact, the navy had begun to express doubts about whether
Germany would soon be self-sufficient in petroleum and to worry that domestic production of fuel oil and diesel was lagging behind that of the gasoline and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/7
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aviation fuel critical for combined-arms operations on land (i.e., supplies for the
army and air force).22 The fact that the man responsible for Germany’s economic
mobilization, Hermann Göring, was also commander in chief of the air force and
privileged the expansion of synthetic gasoline production (including aviation
fuel) over that of fuel oil and diesel fuel did not go unnoticed within the navy.23
Although Germany had poured resources into its burgeoning synthetic-fuel
industry, future production would, according to one naval assessment, likely
only suffice “to absorb” increases in military and civilian consumption. The navy
therefore could not afford to be cut off from the international oil market. Rather
than chase “oil autarky” in Europe, the navy’s position by 1938 was that it ought
“to maintain and forcefully expand connections with foreign oil companies.”24
By September 1939 imported oil accounted for roughly a quarter of the German navy’s diesel supply and a third of its fuel oil supply. For the year as a whole,
228,105 tons of fuel and 125,042 tons of diesel fuel came from overseas.25 The
navy considered this inadequate and wished to accumulate a reserve equivalent
to at least a year’s consumption, after which time anticipated higher domestic
production could pick up the slack. There was no shortage of oil on the international market; the problem, rather, was financial, since Germany lacked the
foreign exchange to pay for imports of sufficient quantities of petroleum from the
major U.S. and British oil companies. The Office of the Four-Year Plan (which
oversaw Germany’s policy of autarky) and the Armed Forces High Command
(theoretically responsible for coordinating all the services but in practice serving as Hitler’s personal military staff with little authority over the other services)
continued to purchase whatever they could from abroad (mainly diesel and fuel
oil) while producing the most expensive products, especially aviation fuel and
lubricants, domestically through either conventional drilling and refining or synthesis. The German navy, by contrast, pursued three separate paths to securing
cheap petroleum from abroad without going through the major oil companies:
Estonian oil shale and crude oil from Iraq and from Mexico.26
GERMANY AND THE SEARCH FOR OIL IN IRAQ, 1932–1936
Estonian oil shale was attractive in spite of its uncompetitive price since Estonia
(an independent republic until 1940) could be a reliable source of supply even
in wartime, because Germany thought it likely that it would still control access
through the Baltic even during a conflict against Britain or the Soviet Union. Exports of petroleum extracted from shale to Germany began in 1937 and reached
110,000 tons in 1939. But oil shale yielded only trivial amounts of naval fuel—the
navy’s prewar contracts guaranteed deliveries of only three thousand tons of fuel
oil a month (at well above the world market price) against a total consumption of
44,300 tons. In any case, deliveries ended in 1940 after the Soviet Union annexed
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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Estonia; also, in August 1941 retreating Red Army troops destroyed the shaleprocessing installations before the Wehrmacht could occupy them.27
With regard to Iraq, the impetus came from a German industrial consortium
comprising four major steel companies—Ferrostaal, Otto Wolff, Mannesmann,
and Stahlunion (although Ferrostaal was the dominant member). This consortium was a partner in the British Oil Development Company in Iraq.28 In fact,
the German navy was a relative latecomer to this story—various civilian agencies
had been considering the consequences of German participation in the BOD
since 1930, when the newly formed company was still negotiating with the Iraqi
government for a concession.29 BOD representatives had assured the German
legation in Baghdad that their aim was to promote the “Open Door” in Iraq and
break the “preferential position” enjoyed by the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC),
a multinational conglomerate composed of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
(after 1935 the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company), Royal Dutch/Shell, the Compagnie
Française des Pétroles, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, and the Standard Oil Company of New York.30 The IPC had secured a formal concession in
1925, initially for the entire country but in 1931, when the company renegotiated the concession, limited to thirty-two thousand square miles—that is, all of
Iraq east of the Tigris River. The company discovered a massive oil field (Baba
Gurgar) in 1927 near Kirkuk but had made little progress in developing it since
then.31 In frustration, the Iraqi government turned in 1932 to the BOD, which
received a concession covering forty-six thousand square miles west of the Tigris
River.32 (The online version of this article reproduces period maps of crude oil
concessions in the Middle East.)
From the start, there was considerable interest in the prospect of German
firms earning tens of millions of Reichsmarks in industrial orders and Germany
finding a cheap source of oil imports.33 There was also some trepidation—the
German Foreign Office warned that if the BOD was too successful, it could spark
a price war in Germany should the major oil companies decide to drive it from
that market. While German consumers would benefit, such domestic petroleum
producers as the chemical cartel IG Farben, which had made massive investments in synthetic-fuel production since 1925, would suffer heavy losses. This
would have a ripple effect throughout the German economy, since expansion
of synthetic-fuel production stimulated demand for labor, coal, and steel.34 Although they were supportive of the ambitions of the BOD, senior Foreign Office
officials suggested that the German government maintain its distance by reining
in German diplomats in Iraq and refraining from extending official support to
the company.35
Initially, most German officials were skeptical of the strategic value of Iraqi
oil, especially in wartime, since it was vulnerable to blockade. But they were
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/7
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impressed by the economic benefits for depression-ridden German industry
and hoped that French and Italian participation in the BOD would improve the
company’s prospects.36 Over the objections of IG Farben, the government agreed
in 1932 to guarantee up to 50 percent of a million-Reichsmark investment made
by the German industrial consortium to acquire half the shares in the BOD held
by one of the founders of the company, Thomas Brown. Although a Scottish
businessman, Brown enjoyed close ties to the German government through his
efforts to promote closer economic relations between Germany and Persia during the 1920s.37 By virtue of these special “founders’ rights,” the German firms
could supply 38 percent of the BOD’s materiel requirements (with a total value
of perhaps 100,000,000 RM) and receive 12 percent of the oil produced by the
company.38
The question of official German support for the BOD had initially been a
purely civilian matter, with the ministries of economics, finance, and foreign affairs taking responsibility. This changed between 1934 and 1936, when the German consortium (in concert with its Italian partners) tried to acquire majority
control of the BOD and of the holding company, Mosul Oil Fields, established to
exploit the BOD’s concession rights.39 The armed services, the German navy in
particular, now evinced considerable interest in the outcome of events in Iraq, as
the rise of the Third Reich—and Hitler’s explicit commitment to a crash rearmament program no matter what the cost—portended a significant rise in military
oil consumption within the coming decade.40
The German consortium within the BOD sought to acquire control of the
company by subscribing to private share offerings to raise capital now unavailable on London financial markets because of the machinations of the rival IPC
to fund the BOD’s exploration efforts and cover the
TABLE 2
“dead rent” (i.e., royalties to be paid before any oil
IRAQI OIL PRODUCTION
(THOUSANDS OF BARRELS)
production had started—starting at £100,000 in gold
in 1933 and rising to £200,000 by 1937) owed to the
1932
836
Iraqi government. Although the BOD had yet to
1933
917
produce oil on a commercial scale (see table 2), the
1934
7,689
industrial consortium and its supporters within the
German government were encouraged by favorable
1935
27,408
geological assessments by Alfred Bentz, Germany’s
1936
30,406
premier petroleum geologist and head of the oil divi1937
31,836
sion of the Prussian Geological Survey. In 1935, he
1938
32,643
estimated that the BOD concession had twenty-three
million tons of proven reserves and another hundred
Source note: Figures drawn from DeGolyer and MacNaughton, Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics (Dallas: DeGolyer
and MacNaughton, 2004).
million tons of probable reserves.41
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Because of Germany’s balance-of-payments difficulties, the German consortium had to pay for most of these new shares with industrial goods required
for the construction of oil production infrastructure, including a railway to the
Mediterranean through Syria. A rail line was necessary because the oil discovered
in the BOD’s concession was too “heavy” (50 percent asphalt content) to pump—
although a pipeline was not out of the question in the future if the Germans
resolved the technical obstacles. (Ferrostaal had, in the interim, also worked out
an agreement with independent German and British refiners to sell them up to a
million tons of heavy oil per year.)42 Total expenditures would have reached over
20,000,000 RM by 1936, but the consortium was willing to move forward if the
Reich put forward a 70 percent financial guarantee (although German bureaucrats speculated it would have settled for 50 percent).43
The question whether to support the push for a greater German stake in the
BOD united military and civilian policy makers. The War Ministry supported
any plan that could increase its supply of petroleum, especially since peacetime
naval diesel and fuel-oil consumption was expected to rise 2.5 times between
1935 and 1938. The navy’s supply/demand position was in fact so tight that it
could only sustain current operations and had nothing left over to stockpile.
Economics Minister Schacht, the man who had stabilized the Reichsmark in 1934
without resorting to devaluation by embracing a rigid system of capital controls
and bilateral trade agreements, liked the idea of taking control of the BOD. For
him, it offered an easy means to reconcile the competing demands of rearming
and of improving Germany’s balance of payments while reducing the country’s
dependence on the U.S. and British major oil companies.44 The Foreign Office
believed that both the British and the Iraqis would welcome a German “counterweight” to the Italians and the Soviets in the Middle East, while the German
minister to Iraq (Fritz Grobba) argued that building a railway to carry oil of the
British Oil Development Company to the Mediterranean would earn Germany
significant goodwill across the Middle East.45 Time was of the essence—the
military and Economics Ministry had to start making preparations immediately
to ensure that there were enough tankers to move the oil from Iraq to Germany
and sufficient independent domestic refining capacity to process it, as most of
the existing refineries were owned by the major oil companies, which would not
process crude oil from rival firms.46
The only consistent opposition came from the Finance Ministry. After initially
backing down in the face of unified support for additional financial support for
the German industrial consortium in August 1935, the ministry dug in its heels
when Ferrostaal requested guarantees a few months later for a further 15,000,000
RM of expenditures (including royalty payments to the Iraqi government,
which the Italians could no longer cover following the outbreak of the Second
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/7
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Italo-Abyssinian War).47 As Finance Minister Johann Ludwig von Krosigk explained to Schacht in December 1935, expanding the Third Reich’s financial
exposure in Iraq made economic sense only if the German group within the
BOD achieved majority control of the company, whereas the plan proposed by
Ferrostaal left the German industrial consortium with only a 33 percent stake.
The low quality of the oil discovered in the BOD’s concession was another impediment. Even assuming it was possible to build a thousand-kilometer railway
capable of transporting sufficient quantities of oil to the Mediterranean coast,
the BOD’s higher operating costs would put it at a disadvantage compared with
the capital-rich IPC, which would redouble its efforts to throttle its competitor,
especially if the BOD tried to move excess oil to the Persian Gulf to compete for
markets beyond Europe.48
A meeting of key officials at the Economics Ministry in December 1935 failed
to reach a consensus.49 The Finance Ministry remained skeptical, while the Economics Ministry, the Naval High Command, and the Foreign Office continued
to support a German takeover of the BOD in spite of the mounting costs.50 In any
event, a decision had to be made soon. The Germans had the option to acquire a
controlling interest in the company along with 50 percent of its future oil production in concert with British and American partners, including the independent
oilman William Rhodes Davis, who would subsequently play a major role in
promoting the German-Mexican oil trade.51
In January 1936, Raeder tried one last time to make the case for both the
strategic and commercial viability of the BOD to Krosigk. The admiral claimed
that the BOD’s concession could produce up to three million tons of crude oil per
year, one-third of which would go to Germany, at a cost of only a pound per ton,
quickly amortizing the costs of building the necessary tankers and storage facilities. Also, recent technological advances meant that the heavy oil from the BOD
concession could be refined into expensive fuels and lubricants. Raeder advised
that at the very least Germany hold on to its shares in the BOD for a while longer,
if only to bargain them for rights to “oil territories in Central or South America,
which could after examination prove to be more advantageous in terms of supplying Germany in either war or peace in view of their geographical situation.”52
During a meeting with Krosigk on 25 March 1936, according to naval records,
Wilhelm Keppler (one of Hitler’s primary economic advisers) apparently dismissed the navy’s plans as “superfluous, since the German Reich would within
a short amount of time cover its entire demand for oil internally.” Keppler was
more concerned, Raeder perceived, by the possibility that the navy might no
longer be a customer for the vast quantities of expensive synthetic fuel to be
produced domestically.53 Keppler later disputed the navy’s characterization of
his position.54 He insisted that he had broached the matter of German control
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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of the BOD with no less an authority than the Führer. Hitler had been skeptical
of supporting a German takeover of the BOD two years before, and nothing had
changed since then. As far as Hitler was concerned, Germany lacked the necessary foreign exchange, and anything short of majority control of the company was
useless. Most importantly, the scheme would “incur for us the enmity of powerful
international oil interests.”55 Finally, Hitler had little incentive to goad the British,
so soon after the remilitarization of the Rhineland.56
Ultimately, the navy’s arguments proved unconvincing, and the Third Reich
opted against issuing financial guarantees large enough to allow the German
industrial consortium to take over the BOD.57 The Italians had already given up
in 1935. The state-owned Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli, which controlled the
Italian stake in the BOD, had reassessed its position due to the threat of League
of Nations oil sanctions following the invasion of Abyssinia. Italy could hardly
depend on oil deliveries from Iraq when they traveled by pipeline through the
French League of Nations mandate of Syria or the British mandates of Transjordan and Palestine. The Italians therefore sold their stake in the BOD to the AngloIranian Oil Company and chose instead to concentrate their efforts in Albania.58
With the Italians out of the way, there was nothing stopping the IPC from taking control of the BOD, initially by covering the “dead rent” for 1936. The Iraqi
prime minister complained to Grobba that the Italians had been paid off by the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (then 51 percent owned by the British government)
with promises to continue oil deliveries during the Abyssinian War. In other
words, he charged, the British government, in collusion with the oil companies,
had rejected the use of oil sanctions over Italy’s brutal invasion of Abyssinia in
order to facilitate Rome’s capitulation in the struggle for control of Middle Eastern oil.59 There is no evidence to support Grobba’s claims (repeated uncritically
by several historians) that the British government had been reluctant to push for
sanctions less out of fear of driving Italy into an alliance with Germany than out of
a desire to take control of the BOD.60 Nevertheless, it is difficult to take issue with
the verdict that the Reich abandoned the BOD less out of narrow concerns over
the economic viability of the project than for broader strategic considerations.61
Ferrostaal eventually (at the end of 1936) sold off its interest in the BOD for
£1,250,000 in foreign exchange and future orders to the IPC, which in turn created a subsidiary (Mosul Holdings Ltd., renamed the Mosul Petroleum Company
in 1941) that acquired control of the BOD in 1937.62 The Naval High Command
was naturally disappointed by this turn of events. The one consolation was that it
might be able to use the proceeds of the sale of the German shares in the BOD for
“Mexican oil rights.”63 But after the sale of Ferrostaal’s shares went through, the
only pledge the navy could secure from the Economics Ministry was a vague assurance that it could use the earnings to hunt for other overseas oil concessions.64
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THE SHIFT TO MEXICO, 1936–1940
German interest in acquiring an oil concession in Mexico predated the First
World War. German geologists had surveyed the country as early as 1912, and the
Deutsche Bank (which controlled the major independent German oil company,
Deutsche Petroleum), the German Foreign Office, and the Imperial German
Navy all expressed interest in securing a concession in Mexico as an alternative
oil source that would allow Germany to break the Standard Oil Company’s domination of the European market. In May 1914, the Mexican dictator Victoriano
Huerta even offered the German ambassador a 150,000-square-kilometer concession in Tampico, which would be expropriated from its American owners, in
a vain attempt to solicit German support to prop up his regime, which collapsed
in July under pressure from the U.S. government.65 (See the online version of this
article for a reproduction of a period map of Mexican oil fields.)
After the BOD fiasco, the German government, even though Germany lacked
the spare refinery capacity to process any crude oil besides that imported by the
major oil companies, gave the navy permission in 1937 to pursue opportunities
to purchase oil concessions in Latin America. This was the German navy’s third
and final attempt to secure its own independent source of supply before 1939.
There were two provisos: the navy’s efforts could “in no way disrupt the internal
petroleum economy,” and the Third Reich would not consider providing support
to any endeavor involving “politically unreliable countries.”66 The Spanish Civil
War, which began the year before, lent additional urgency to the search for new
suppliers. Naval fuel consumption increased after the Germans joined “nonintervention” patrols with the British and French while supporting operations by
Nationalist forces and the Condor Legion of German volunteers. Just as importantly, and also in 1937, Shell and Standard Oil of New Jersey began demanding
full payment in hard currency.67
The navy moved quickly. As early as September 1936 it had asked the German
commercial attaché in Mexico City to query the Mexicans about whether they
were interested in establishing a partnership between Germany and Mexico’s
state-owned company, Petromex, to start production on land within Mexico’s national petroleum reserve.68 The Mexicans initially appeared receptive, but negotiations had stalled by 1938, owing to skepticism on the part of the German Foreign
Office and German oil companies (which worried about antagonizing their U.S.
and British counterparts), as well as the reluctance of the Mexican government
to conclude an intergovernmental accord with the Third Reich when domestic
nationalist hostility against foreign control of Mexico’s oil was running high.69
The Mexican government’s nationalization of its oil industry in March 1938—
and with it the expropriation of the properties owned by U.S., British, and Dutch
oil companies—afforded the Germans an unparalleled opportunity to corner
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the market for Mexican oil.70 The major oil companies had retaliated against
nationalization by launching a boycott of expropriated Mexican oil, and Mexico
was desperate for new customers as well as technical and financial support to
continue increasing output (see table 3).71 Whatever Mexico’s misgivings about
the Third Reich, there were no other customers for its oil (besides independent
companies that were themselves planning to sell to Germany), especially after
negotiations with Italy and Japan failed. The Mexicans were in such desperate
straits that they were willing to accept payment through barter. The German
navy had meanwhile established a partnership with the Dresdner Bank, which
was being used for “camouflage” and handled negotiations with the Mexicans
through a subsidiary.72
In April 1938 the Naval High Command asked the Economics Ministry to
release £600,000 of the foreign exchange earned from the sale of the German
shares in the BOD to purchase an oil concession in Mexico.73 The German navy
played fast and loose with the truth to get its way. According to the German minister in Mexico City, the Mexicans were not nearly as eager to grant a concession
as the Naval High Command claimed; their problem was disposing of excess oil
they already had on hand.74 But even if a concession agreement went through,
production would not start, according to the geologist Bentz, until “the end of
1941 at the earliest.”75 Most importantly, the navy failed to convince its critics that
Germany had more to gain than it would lose through closer ties with Mexico.
The Economics Ministry had no objection to the navy continuing to buy Mexican
oil, but it opposed any intergovernmental accord and rejected the navy’s request
for foreign exchange. Instead, it tried to convince the navy that oil autarky was
within sight, while also confessing its reluctance to incur the wrath of the major
oil companies by defying their boycott of Mexico.76
TABLE 3
The Third Reich was dependent on the U.S. and BritMEXICAN OIL PRODUCTION
ish companies to sell them petroleum that could then
(THOUSANDS OF BARRELS)
be stockpiled, and for that reason Germany could not
1933
34,000
afford “to annoy” them just yet.77
1934
38,172
Raeder tried again in September and December
1938 through personal appeals to Göring to release
1935
40,241
the requested £600,000 to begin preparatory work.
1936
41,028
The Mexican offer was almost too good to be true.
1937
46,907
Unlike in Iraq, where the logistical challenges of
1938
38,506
moving oil from the interior to the coast were formi1939
42,898
dable, Mexico was offering participation in a stateowned concession only sixty kilometers from ports
1940
44,036
on the Atlantic coast.78 From geological estimates
Source note: Figures drawn from DeGolyer and MacNaughcompleted by Bentz in 1936 and 1937, Raeder was
ton, Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics.
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convinced that the concession in question could yield up to ten million tons of
oil per year (with 20 percent going to the Mexican government), with shipments
to Germany beginning a year after the start of operations.79 All of this could be
had for an expenditure of only £600,000 in foreign exchange, which on the open
market would pay for a mere 150,000 tons of petroleum. Plus, Germany could sell
any surplus from its operations in Mexico for hard currency. As long as Germany
took the “necessary precautions,” its Mexican oil concession might even serve as
a source of supply in wartime.80
Opposition to the navy’s plans now came from a former ally—the Economics
Ministry—which tried to convince the Naval High Command to abandon its
quixotic efforts. During an interagency conference on 15 November 1938, the
ministry warned the navy that increasing exports to Mexico to pay for imported
oil could undermine Germany’s overall financial position.81 The German navy
stuck to its guns, but its efforts proved fruitless; the navy and the Dresdner Bank
eventually had to abandon their negotiations with Mexico City for a concession
in the face of implacable opposition from the Economics Ministry, which again
denied the navy’s application for the release of foreign exchange in December
1938.82
There was one other possibility: the Mexicans were still sitting on copious
amounts of oil and willing to sell on the basis of barter with deferred payment.
Through supply contracts with the aforementioned William Davis (who owned
concessions within the rich Poza Rica oil field and had been pushing for closer
German-Mexican commercial relations since 1933), the German navy took full
advantage of the Mexicans’ difficulties following nationalization.83 In the short
run, it acquired extra oil to cover its additional requirements during the Spanish
Civil War. Also, Mexico quickly became an invaluable source of oil for the navy in
its redoubled efforts to find more-accommodating suppliers than the major U.S.
and British companies, such as Shell and Standard Oil, which had been demanding full payment in hard currency since 1937. The navy’s schemes were a thorn
in the side of the major oil companies, which started making vague threats and
sought to discredit Davis.84
The major oil companies also dangled a number of carrots to keep the Third
Reich from violating their boycott against Mexico. Both Standard Oil of New
Jersey and Royal Dutch/Shell (the two foreign firms with the largest interests in
Mexico prior to nationalization) offered to place additional commercial orders
with German firms and accept partial compensation through clearing agreements.85 In August 1938, Shell went farther and made the Third Reich an offer it
could not refuse: Shell would replace any oil imported from Mexico and accept
payment on a clearing basis. The navy was not fooled—Shell’s offer was a ploy to
poison Germany’s relationship with Mexico, which had been a reliable partner
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even during the Sudeten crisis that year. Both Standard and Shell, on the other
hand, had created numerous “difficulties,” including diverting tankers heading
to Germany to Britain. Mexico was also one of the few oil producers willing
to accept payment in Reichsmarks, and if Germany cut ties there, it would be
completely at the mercy of the major U.S. and British oil companies. Rather
than knuckle under to the major companies’ blackmail, the navy pointed out
that “there are in the world thousands of independent oil companies besides
the majors, among which many would be ready under favorable conditions to
undertake the delivery of all manner of fuels to Germany.”86 Economics Minister
Walther Funk did not dispute that his department had sought to maintain good
relations with the major oil companies but countered that this had been done in
accordance with Germany’s overall energy-security strategy, which stressed the
fulfillment of immediate requirements.87
The available evidence seems to support the navy’s argument.
Mexico, particularly under the left-wing president Lázaro Cárdenas,
had little affinity for the Third Reich, but it had to stifle its political
misgivings to make ends meet.88 The Reich imported 649,216 tons of
Mexican petroleum in 1938, compared with 281,266 tons in 1933,
much of it arranged by private firms. Imports continued to rise right
up to the outbreak of the Second World War. Davis’s oil company, for
instance, exported during the first eight months of 1939 1,972,609
Walther Funk at the Nuremberg war
crimes trials
tons of Mexican oil, most of which went to Germany—by now the
U.S. government photo
largest customer for Mexican petroleum products.89 As a result, the
German navy’s reserves of diesel fuel rose from 262,000 tons on 1 January 1938
to 650,000 on war’s eve (about three years’ wartime consumption), even though
its share of domestic German production had not increased.90
By the time the Second World War began, the German navy’s efforts to cover
the differential between its expected wartime consumption and actual domestic
production by stockpiling large quantities of imported oil had, in the assessment
of one historian, been consigned “to the realm of fantasy.”91 Raeder complained
that the other government departments had been “dismissive” of the navy’s suggestions, which he claimed could have provided Germany with the means to accumulate large military and civilian stockpiles. The Economics Ministry, Raeder
contended in a particularly nasty missive of June 1940, had been in the pocket
of the U.S. and British major oil companies, and its policies were “disastrous” for
Germany’s energy security. There was no better proof of the soundness of the
navy’s alternative strategy, Raeder argued, than the fact that Göring had been
forced following the war’s outbreak “to withdraw petroleum from the navy and
transfer it to the economy and other branches of the armed services.”92
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After the war, Raeder bragged that the navy had managed to stockpile roughly
a million tons of petroleum before the war from a variety of sources—“most of
all from Mexico.”93 Was his boasting justified? Yes and no. At the onset of the
Second World War, Germany’s naval fuel reserves were small compared with
those of Japan after Pearl Harbor (forty-three million barrels in total—about 90
percent of which was controlled by the Imperial Japanese Navy) or even Italy in
July 1940 (1,666,674 tons for all three services). These figures worked out to two
years’ wartime consumption, including domestic oil production, for the Japanese
navy and less than five months for the Italian navy (leaving aside army and air
force requirements, and based on the rate of consumption during the first quarter
of 1941, since Italy’s domestic production was minuscule).94
German naval reserves at the start of the war were therefore much smaller in
terms of volume than those of either Italy or Japan, but the German navy could
at least fall back on a burgeoning domestic oil industry (both synthetic and
crude), as well as a share of Romanian oil production. Japan and Italy were not
so fortunate, once they lost access to overseas imports and expended their prewar
reserves. Most importantly, the German navy’s position was much stronger than
that of either its sister services or of the German war economy as a whole. At
least some of the credit is attributable to the navy’s success in securing additional
imports from Mexico before the outbreak of hostilities. The Third Reich went to
war with a reserve stock of only 1,898,000 tons, which amounted to less than six
months’ worth of peacetime consumption.95 As of 25 November 1939, however,
the navy alone possessed reserves of 725,000 cubic meters (cbm—i.e., 6.3 barrels
of oil, or a little less than one ton) of diesel fuel and 382,000 cbm of fuel oil, not
including 50,000 tons of diesel fuel stored abroad. On the basis of the average rate
of consumption during the first three months of the war (8,100 cbm of diesel and
71,500 cbm of fuel oil), and assuming no new construction in 1940, the diesel
reserves including U-boat consumption would have lasted for more than seven
years, while supplies of fuel oil would suffice for five and a half months.96 Sufficient quantities of diesel fuel for U-boats were available until 1944, but the supply
of fuel oil tightened after 1940, when the navy had to start transferring some of its
stocks to the German army and then the Italian navy.97 Like the industrious ant,
the navy was punished for its success by having to support unprepared grasshoppers across Germany and Italy.
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND HARD CHOICES
No one can deny that a war machine in the Hydrocarbon Age requires fuel, but
not all fuels are created equal. Nor for that matter are the interests of consumers, even within a single nation, identical. Both historical and contemporary
energy analysts would be wise to avoid a monolithic understanding of the role
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of energy (strategic or otherwise) within a given society. Such an understanding
has unfortunately been the case with the Third Reich. Building on the work of
wartime analysts such as those of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, students of
Germany’s prewar oil policy have focused their attention on the Third Reich’s
development of synthetic fuel from coal as a means of breaking Germany’s dependence on overseas oil sources that were controlled by its enemies, priced in
foreign exchange, and susceptible to blockade in wartime.98
Synthetic fuel did indeed afford Germany a measure of energy independence
on the eve of the Second World War, but only for certain kinds of petroleum
products, namely, lighter fuels, such as gasoline. While the German army and air
force enjoyed considerable benefits from prewar policies, the navy did not and
was forced to pursue imaginative means of securing the diesel fuel and fuel oil it
required but Germany’s domestic synthetic- and crude-oil industries could not
provide. The bitter feud that ensued exposed one of the contradictory tendencies
at the heart of the Third Reich’s supposedly totalitarian approach to rearmament
—one between a dominant, “continental” faction obsessed with “autarky” and a
navy that retained a “maritime” perspective.99 Leaving aside whether its assessments of German prospects in Iraq and Mexico were justified, the navy’s pursuit of
an independent energy-security strategy ran afoul of the overall energy-security
strategy of the Third Reich. That larger strategy sought to appease the U.S. and
British oil companies in peacetime even as it stockpiled supplies and built up its
synthetic-fuel industry to wage a war that would forever free Germany from its
dependence on overseas raw materials—in part by expropriating the assets of the
very companies with which it had traded in peacetime.100
Since the German navy (aside from its U-boats) played a relatively minor role
during the Second World War, it is tempting to dismiss the story of its efforts
to secure oil from Iraq and Mexico during the 1930s as a historical curiosity.101
But this would be a mistake, for those episodes afford us insight concerning
Germany’s wider grand strategy. Germany did not reject a stake in the oil of Iraq
or Mexico merely because of financial constraints. Starting in October 1936,
around the time Ferrostaal began selling off its interest in the BOD, the Third
Reich would expend 574,000,000 RM on synthetic-fuel projects (partially offset
by higher duties on imported crude oil) during just the first year of the so-called
Four-Year Plan of 1936.102 Compared with such astronomical sums, several million Reichsmarks in the form of industrial goods or foreign exchange appears to
have been a relatively small price to pay for hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of tons of Iraqi or Mexican crude oil per year.
The problem, instead, was that the navy’s ambitions clashed with the Third
Reich’s overarching strategy, since the latter was geared for preparing for war at
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the earliest possible time. The German navy’s perspective on energy security was
shaped by the fact that it required years, if not decades, to design and construct
platforms capable of implementing any naval strategy—be it a guerre de course
using cruisers or a “Mahanian” concept centered on capital ships. The navy had
been prepared to wait a decade between the design and commissioning of its first
“pocket battleship” in 1933 (Deutschland); waiting a handful of years while German interests developed new oil fields in Iraq or Mexico was not a tremendous
sacrifice.103
But the Third Reich as a whole had only a narrow window of opportunity
to achieve its continental objectives. This meant that decisions, especially after
1938, concerning the allocation of economic and financial resources would be
made on the basis of Germany’s immediate needs. Such thinking, for instance,
also encouraged the German air force to prioritize the production of medium
and tactical bombers over four-engine heavy bombers, even though German officers shared the prevailing strategic consensus regarding the potential efficacy
of strategic bombing.104 In the case of the navy, whose oil-related schemes would
require considerable time to reach fruition, the Third Reich had no option but
to maintain its businesslike relationship with the U.S. and British major oil companies, which had proved relatively accommodating with regard to Germany’s
crippling shortage of foreign exchange. Their oil might have been more expensive
than that offered by either Iraq or Mexico, but it was available immediately, and
its purchase did not jeopardize relations with other great powers. Within this
context, even Hitler realized that the German navy’s confrontational policies visà-vis the oil companies promised little material gain over the short run, and that
at a potentially high strategic cost.
From the perspective of contemporary energy security, the example of the
German navy before 1939 represents a valuable lesson in resource management
in an era of tight economic and financial constraints. Force development, especially in peacetime, when a nation has yet to mobilize completely, requires hard
choices about whose requirements can be met and at what cost to other national
consumers. In a constrained resource environment, a policy that seeks to maximize advantage for any one service may entail costs that run contrary to interests
of rival institutions. Rather than deluding themselves that it is possible to achieve
security in every area, civilian and military decision makers should recognize the
potential trade-offs that their decisions can have on other institutions residing
under the national security umbrella. Most importantly, they must always be
prepared to adjust their expectations and reconcile their parochial interests to
the evolving demands and priorities of national strategy in a dynamic strategic
environment.
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